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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS. The debtors claimed a homestead
exemption for their residence and the 58 acres of land on
which it was located. The property was located within the
city limits and consisted of the house, a barn and other
farm buildings, and open land used for crop production and
pasturing horses. The property was not platted but was
surrounded by residential properties of normal size for city
dwellings. The debtors had sold a portion of the property
which was converted to a residential subdivision. The
property was not surrounded by residential properties when
purchased 35 years ago and the debtors had used the
property continuously, except for the sold portion, as a
farm. The court held that, under state law, the debtors’ 58
acre property retained its character as rural farm property
eligible for the rural homestead exemption of up to 120
acres. In re Becker, 212 B.R. 322 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1997).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
POST-PETITION INTEREST.  The debtors filed for
Chapter 11 in 1982 and the IRS filed a secured and an
unsecured claim for employment taxes owed by the
debtors. The proof of claim indicated that additional
interest may be assessed on the claim during the
bankruptcy case. However, the IRS did not file any claim
for post-petition interest on the secured claim. The debtors’
plan provided for full payment of the tax claim but did not
include any payment for post-petition interest on the
secured claim. The debtor received a discharge but after the
discharge, the IRS sought to collect interest for the post-
petition, pre-confirmation period. The court held that no
post-petition, pre-confirmation interest was allowed where
the IRS failed to file a claim or object to the plan. United
States v. Victor, 121 B.R. 1383 (10th Cir. 1997).
SETOFF. The debtor airline was owed a refund of
excise taxes by the IRS. The debtor owed claims made by
other federal governmental agencies, including the Federal
Aviation Administration, the Defense Finance Accounting
Service and the National Finance Center. The agencies
sought to offset the IRS refund against the amounts owed
to the agencies. The court held that the setoff was allowed
because the agencies of the federal government were
considered a governmental unit for purposes of the setoff
rules. In re HAL, Inc., 122 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 1997),
aff’g, 196 B.R. 159 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1996).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CROP INSURANCE-ALM § 13.04.*  The FCIC has
adopted as final regulations which include the Canning and
Processing Tomato Endorsement in the Common Crop
Insurance Policy and restrict the endorsement provisions to
1997 and earlier crop years. 62 Fed. Reg. 54339 (Oct. 20,
1997).
The FCIC has adopted as final regulations which
include the Prune Endorsement in the Common Crop
Insurance Policy and restrict the endorsement provisions to
1997 and earlier crop years. 62 Fed. Reg. 58628 (Oct. 30,
1997).
The FCIC has adopted as final regulations which
include the Canning and Processing Bean Endorsement in
the Common Crop Insurance Policy and restrict the
endorsement provisions to 1997 and earlier crop years. 62
Fed. Reg. 58621 (Oct. 30, 1997).
MILK MARKETING ORDERS.  The plaintiff milk
producer association challenged as arbitrary and capricious
the Class I pricing scheme of the federal milk marketing
orders promulgated under the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act, 7 U.S.C. § 608c(1). The current ruling was
the third time the court had ruled on the issue of whether
the USDA had sufficient evidence to make the factual
findings required by the statute to support the pricing
scheme. In the first two rulings, the court found that the
USDA had failed to make specific factual findings as
required by the statute to support the pricing system. In the
current ruling, the court again found that the USDA did not
make sufficient factual findings as required by the statute.
The court concluded that after three attempts, the USDA
had no possibility of making the required factual findings
and held that the Class I pricing scheme was arbitrary and
contrary to the statute. The statute required the pricing
scheme to be based upon “the price of feeds, the available
supply of feeds, and other economic conditions which
affect market supply and demand for milk or its products in
the marketing area to which the contemplated marketing
agreemnt, order, or amendment relates.” Instead, the court
found that the current Class I pricing scheme was based
solely upon the local market’s distance from Eau Claire,
WI. The court found that, even if the distance differential
had an effect on local markets, the USDA had failed to
demonstrate that effect.   Minnesota Milk Producers v.
Glickman, Civil No. 4-90-31 (D. Minn. 1997).
RECORDS. The defendant was a farmer who had
received federal farm disaster payments. In response to a
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tip, the Inspector General (IG) of the USDA initiated an
audit of disaster payments made in the defendant’s county,
including the defendant’s payments. The IG sought records
held by the defendant, dating more than two years before
the date of the request. When the defendant failed to
provide the records the IG issued a subpoena for the
records and sought enforcement of the subpoena in the
current case. The defendant argued that the IG subpoena
exceeded the IG’s subpoena authority and was too broad in
that it required the production of records not required to be
kept by the disaster payment program. The court held that
the subpoena was a valid exercise of the IG’s authority to
investigate fraud in USDA programs. The court also held
that, although the disaster program did not require records
to be retained more than two years, the defendant could be
required to produce older records still in existence as of the
date of the subpoena. Inspector General of USDA v.
Glenn, 122 F.3d 1007 (11th Cir. 1997), aff’g, 972 F.
Supp. 676 (M.D. Ga. 1997).
WAREHOUSES.  The plaintiff operated a grain
weighing, grading and inspection service for warehouses
licensed under the U.S. Warehouse Act. The plaintiff also
provided third party supervision for other weighers
providing Class II certified weights. The Missouri
legislature passed the Missouri Grain Warehouse Law
(MGWL), Mo. Rev. Stat. § 411.030.2, which gave the
Missouri Department of Agriculture (MDA) the exclusive
authority over supervising grain weighing in the state. The
MDA issued regulations stating that it had exclusive
authority to provide third party supervision for Class II
certified weights. The plaintiff argued that the MGWL and
regulations were pre-empted by the U.S. Warehouse Act.
The court held that the U.S. Warehouse Act was intended
to preempt the entire field of grain weighing at federally
licensed warehouses and, because the supervision of Class
II certified weights involves grain weighing, the MGWL
and the regulations promulgated thereunder could not
restrict the plaintiff’s right to provide supervision services.
Heart of America Grain v. Missouri Dept. of Agric., 123
F.3d 1098 (8th Cir. 1997).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
DISCLAIMER. The taxpayer’s parents established a
pre-1977 trust prior to the birth of the taxpayer. The trust
provided for trustee discretion to pay net income and
principal for the taxpayer’s support, education and health
until the taxpayer was age 25, at which time one-third of
the trust corpus would be distributed to the taxpayer. The
taxpayer did not receive any benefits from the trust before
making a disclaimer of any interest in certain assets held in
the trust. The taxpayer learned about the trust a few days
before turning 21 and filed the disclaimer within nine
months after learning about the trust. The IRS ruled that
the disclaimer was qualified.  Ltr. Rul. 9745008, Aug. 6,
1997.
The taxpayer was a remainder beneficiary of a trust
established in 1936. The primary beneficiary died in 1976
and the taxpayer executed a written disclaimer of the
remainder interest in the trust within nine months after the
death of the primary beneficiary but more than nine months
after learning about the remainder interest. The disclaimer
was not filed with the probate court until several months
later. The taxpayer agreed that the disclaimer was not
timely for federal estate tax purposes. The issue was the
effective date of the disclaimer and, therefore, the gift of
the disclaimed interest. The IRS examined state law and
determined that the effective date of the disclaimer was the
date it was filed with the probate court. Ltr. Rul. 9743002,
July 9, 1997.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS. The
decedent was the beneficiary of a trust established by the
will of a predeceased spouse. The remainders of the trust
were held by the children of the spouse and their issue. The
decedent exercised a general power of appointment over
the trust principal for the payment of administrative costs,
funeral expenses and taxes. The remainder of the trust
passed to the children and, in the case of a predeceased
child, one child’s issue. The trustee obtained a state court
order splitting the trust into three separate trusts, one for
each beneficiary, each with a pro rata share of trust assets
and each maintaining the order of succession and rights to
trust income and principal as the original trust. The IRS
ruled that, because the decedent had a general power of
appointment over the trust principal, the trust principal was
included in the decedent’s estate and the decedent would
be considered the transferor of the trust principal for GSTT
purposes. The IRS also ruled that, because the one child
predeceased the decedent, the child’s issue were not skip
persons and their share of the trust was not subject to
GSTT. The IRS also ruled that the splitting of the trust was
not a taxable distribution and would not subject the trust to
GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9744020, Aug. 4, 1997.
IRA. The decedent owned an interest in an IRA which
had a trust as the named beneficiary. The decedent’s
surviving spouse was the sole beneficiary and trustee of the
trust upon the decedent’s death. The decedent’s will
provided for passing to the surviving spouse of as much of
the IRA as could be passed to the surviving spouse without
incurring additional estate tax. The remainder of the IRA
passed to another trust for the surviving spouse of which
the spouse was also the sole trustee. The spouse had the
power to distribute the remainder of the IRA directly to the
spouse. The spouse made the distribution by transferring
the funds to an IRA in the spouse’s name. The IRS ruled
that the remainder portion of the IRA which was
distributed to the spouse was not treated as inherited by the
spouse and could be rolled over to the spouse’s IRA
without tax. Ltr. Rul. 9744024, Aug. 5, 1997.
POWER OF APPOINTMENT. The decedent had
created a trust for the benefit of the decedent with a
remainder to the decedent’s son. The trust was intended to
be written so as to give the son a limited testamentary
power of appointment over trust principal but a scrivener’s
error allowed an interpretation of the trust so as to give the
son a general power of appointment. The trustee and son
petitioned a state court to correct the scrivener’s error to
limit the power of appointment. The IRS ruled that the trust
was erroneously drafted and that correction of the error
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would give the son only a limited power of appointment.
Ltr. Rul. 9743033, July 25, 1997.
STEPPED-UP BASIS. The taxpayer had owned
property with a deceased spouse as tenants by the entirety.
The decedent’s estate had included 50 percent of the
property in the gross estate, causing 50 percent of the
property’s basis to be increased to the estate tax value. The
taxpayer later sold a portion of the property and had
originally claimed taxable gain based on the step-up in
basis of 50 percent of the property. The taxpayer later filed
an amended estate tax return and an individual tax return
for a refund by claiming that the deceased spouse’s estate
was entitled to include all of the property in the gross
estate. The court and the parties agreed that Patten v. U.S.,
116 F.3d 1029 (4th Cir. 1997) controlled the case to allow
the amendment of the estate and individual income tax
returns and the step-up of the entire basis of the property.
Wilburn v. United States, 97-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,881 (D. Md. 1997).
TRUSTS. A parent established an irrevocable trust for
a child with the spouse as trustee. The child’s issue and
heirs were the remainder holders. The trust provided for the
child to have a testamentary power of appointment over
trust corpus. The trust also provided the child with the
power to withdraw new contributions within 30 days after
being notified of the new contributions. The IRS ruled that
the child would be considered the owner of the trust and
that, upon failure of the child to withdraw new
contributions, the child will be deemed to have released the
power to withdraw while retaining a right to income from
the contributions. The IRS also ruled that the parent’s
contributions to the trust would be eligible for the annual
gift tax exclusion so long as there existed no express or
implied agreement by the child to not make withdrawals of
the new contributions. Ltr. Rul. 9745010, Aug. 7, 1997.
VALUATION OF STOCK. The decedent owned a 50
percent community property interest in the stock in a
corporation which provided small loans. The decedent’s
spouse owned the other 50 percent community property
interest. The court allowed a discount in the value of the
stock for the decedent’s minority interest and for lack of
marketability. Estate of Fleming v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1997-484.
The taxpayer owned shares of stock in an S corporation
which owned one asset, a building leased to business
tenants. The taxpayer made gifts of stock to family
members and valued the stock gifts by first determining the
value of the corporation’s asset less the tax costs of built-in
capital gains from a hypothetical sale and then discounting
the fair market value of the stock by a 25 percent minority
interest discount. The court found that no sale of the
corporation’s asset was contemplated or necessary and that
the donees had the power to prevent recognition of the
built-in gains indefinitely. The court held that neither the
costs of sale or the tax costs of built-in gains could reduce
the fair market value of the corporation’s asset for gift tax
purposes. Eisenberg v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-483.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BUSINESS EXPENSES.  The taxpayer was employed
as a pizza deliverer and was required to use his own car
and cellular phone while delivering pizzas. The taxpayer
claimed deductions for the automobile expenses and the
cost of the cellular phone but the deductions were based on
estimates because the taxpayer did not keep records of the
automobile and cellular phone use. The court denied
deductions in excess of the amount allowed by the IRS.
Olvera v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-488.
The taxpayers, husband and wife, formed a corporation
for the purpose of developing and selling computer
software for translating foreign languages.  The taxpayers
began hiring independent contractors to develop the
software, purchased computers for the company, consulted
with experts and made one sale of the software in 1988.
The company did not have any profit in 1988. The court
held that the corporation could deduct business losses as
ordinary and necessary business expenses because the
corporation operated an active trade or business in 1988.
Lamont v. United States, 97-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,861 (Fed. Cls. 1997).
CAPITAL GAINS. The Tax Relief Act of 1997, see 8
Agric. L. Digest 103 (Aug. 8, 1997), created three capital
gains tax rates for noncorporate taxpayers. The Congress
has pending legislation which provides technical
amendments to the new rates to coordinate the new rules
with other provisions of the IRC. The IRS has provided
guidance for the new coordination rules in the pending
legislation.
Under prior law, certain inherited property, if disposed
of within one year after the decedent’s death, was deemed
to have been held for more than one year under I.R.C. §
1223(11) or (12). Such property if disposed of within 18
months after the decedent’s death, is now deemed to have
been held for more than 18 months. A similar rule applies
for certain patents described in Section 1235(a). Gain or
loss from a Section 1256 contract, to the extent that it is
treated as long-term capital gain or loss under Section
1256(a)(3), is now treated as attributable to property held
for more than 18 months.
If a portion of the taxpayer’s net Section 1231 gain for
the year is recharacterized as ordinary income under
Section 1231(c), the gain so recharacterized consists of any
net Section 1231 gain in the 28 percent group, then any
Section 1231 gain in the 25 percent group, and finally any
net Section 1231 gain in the 20 percent group.
New I.R.C. § 55(b)(3) provided favorable alternative
minimum tax rates for certain categories of capital gain.
The amounts of these gain are determined according to the
principles used for regular tax purposes, although the AMT
amounts can vary from the regular tax amounts because of
AMT adjustments and preferences. An article on the
Notice will appear in a forthcoming issue of the Digest.
Notice 97-59, I.R.B. 1997-__, __.
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CASUALTY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].*  The taxpayer
corporation operated several timberlands which were
infested with southern pine beetles. Although the beetles
were always present in the timberlands, in several tax
years, the beetles caused major damage to the taxpayer’s
timber. The court held that because an infestation of beetles
can kill a tree within days, the infestation at epidemic
proportions was a deductible casualty loss. The court held,
however, that the taxpayer was not entitled to any
deduction because the taxpayer’s records were insufficient
to prove the amount of loss.  The taxpayer also had several
forests destroyed by fires and one tract destroyed by the
eruption of Mount St. Helens. The court held that the fires
and eruption were casualty events allowing the taxpayer a
deduction for the loss of trees. The appellate court affirmed
on these issues. The taxpayer had used the depletion block
method of determining the loss from the casualties. The
IRS argued that the  “tree stand” method should have been
used. The trial court had overruled precedent and ruled that
the tree stand method should have been used. The appellate
court reversed on this issue, holding that the precedent
should have been followed, allowing the depletion block
method for determining the amount of loss. The taxpayer
began salvage logging of the affected areas and recognized
gain from the income from these activities. The IRS had
allowed the taxpayer to recognize these gains under I.R.C.
§ 1033. The trial court held that the taxpayer was not
required to offset these gains against the losses. The
appellate court affirmed this holding because the salvage
operations were considered separate activities from the
casualties.  On remand of the issue of the calculation of the
loss, the trial court held that the taxpayer had provided
sufficient proof of loss of value using the depletion block
method.   Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S., 97-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,880 (Fed. Cl. 1997), on rem. from, 92 F.3d
1148 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 776 (1997),
aff’g in part and rev’g in part, 32 Fed. Cl. 80 (1994).
The taxpayer had established a brokerage account with
a broker who used fraudulent means to make unauthorized
transactions with the account. A precipitous drop in the
stock market caused a large loss in the taxpayer’s account
and the taxpayer sued the broker and the brokerage firm for
recovery of losses resulting from unauthorized trading on
the account by the broker. At the end of a tax year, the case
was pending and the taxpayer claimed a loss deduction.
The Tax Court had denied the deduction, holding that the
law suit against the broker had a reasonable chance of a
recovery for the taxpayer since there was amble evidence
of the broker’s fraudulent use of the taxpayer’s account.
During the pendency of the tax case, the taxpayer received
a negotiated settlement with the broker. The taxpayer
argued that the Tax Court had impermissably considered
the settlement as evidence that the loss was recoverable at
the end of the tax year. The appellate court affirmed the
Tax Court decision, although the appellate court held that
the Tax Court could not consider subsequent events in
determining whether a loss was recoverable at the end of a
previous tax year. The appellate court found that the Tax
Court had not relied on the settlement in determining that
the loss recovery was reasonably possible at the end of the
prior tax year.  Jeppsen v. Comm’r, 97-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH ) ¶ 50,878 (10th Cir. 1997), aff’g, T.C. Memo.
1995-342.
EXPENSES.  The estimated deductible costs for use in
adjusting farm expenses to exclude the cost of producing
home-consumed farm produce on 1997 income tax returns
as issued by the Iowa State University Extension Service
are as follows--
Pork $33.00 per 100 lbs. liveweight
Beef $57.25 per 100 lbs. liveweight
Lamb $48.30 per 100 lbs. liveweight
Broilers $1.49 per 4 pound bird
Eggs $0.60 per dozen
Milk $9.00 per 100 lbs. or $0.77 per gallon
The above costs include all cash costs, depreciation and
deductible production costs of home-raised feed.  No
charge is made for the farm operator's labor.  If hired labor
or purchased grain and roughages are used to produce these
products, or if high interest costs are incurred, the costs
should be increased accordingly.  In arriving at production
costs, it was assumed that the young animals were raised
and fed.  FM 1421, Iowa State University, November
1997.
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayers were husband and
wife, with the husband working at least 50 hours a week as
a physician. The taxpayers also owned a farm which grew
figs and pistachios. The taxpayers also started a Portuguese
water dog breeding operation. The court held that the dog
breeding operation was not operated with the intent to
make a profit over the first three years (a relatively short
period for hobby loss cases) of operation because (1) the
taxpayers did not maintain separate records for the
individual dogs which could be used to determine
profitability of each dog, (2) the taxpayers made no attempt
to minimize the major costs of the operation, (3) the
taxpayers did not seek expert economic advice as to
earning a profit from dog breeding, (4) the taxpayers
received substantial recreational benefit from the activity,
(5) the taxpayer failed to show any expected or actual
appreciation in business assets, (6) the losses were not
associated with normal start-up costs but were part of the
normal operation of the activity, and (7) the activity had
substantial losses which offset substantial income from
other businesses and employment of the taxpayers.   Smith
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-503.
The taxpayers operated a thoroughbred breeding and
racing activity which the taxpayers agreed was not
operated with an intent to make a profit, for federal income
tax purposes. The deductible expenses were thus limited to
the income from the activity. The IRS argued that the
allowed expenses under I.R.C. § 183 were miscellaneous
expenses not deductible when determining the taxpayers’
liability for alternative minimum tax (AMT). The court
ruled that, where a business is not conducted with the
intent to make a profit, deductions for business expenses
were limited to those allowed under I.R.C. § 183(b) to
those not exceeding the business income from the activity.
Under I.R.C. § 67(a), deductions from AMT income were
not allowed unless expressly allowed by Section 67(b).
Because Section 67(b) did not list the deductions allowed
under Section 183(b), the Section 183(b) deductions were
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not allowed against AMT income. The taxpayers argued
that some of the Section 183(b) deductions were allowed
under I.R.C. § 162 as normal business expenses. The court
held that Section 162 did not apply to allow the deductions
because the taxpayers’ activity was not a trade or business
because it was not operated with the intent to make a profit.
Purdey v. Comm’r, 97-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,894
(Fed. Cls. 1997).
LEGAL FEES. The taxpayer was divorced and the
divorce decree included payment to the taxpayer of a
portion of the ex-spouse’s pension benefits. The taxpayer
filed a suit to have the pension payments recalculated. The
taxpayer sought to deduct the legal fees as capital expenses
incurred to protect a capital asset, the taxpayer’s intrerest in
the pension plan. The court held that the legal fees were not
incurred to protect a capital asset but only to protect the
taxpayer’s interest in ordinary income from the pension
plan; therefore, the legal fees were deductible only as
miscellaneous deductions subject to the greater than 2
percent of income limitation. Glassman v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1997-497.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
   ELECTION. See summary under S CORPORATIONS,
infra.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in October
1997, the weighted average is 6.83 percent with the
permissible range of 6.14 to 7.30 percent (90 to 109
percent permissable range) and 6.14 to 7.51 percent (90 to
110 percent permissable range) for purposes of
determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. §
412(c)(7).  Notice 97-56, I.R.B. 1997-43, 19.
REPORTING. Because of changes in the Tax Relief
Act of 1997, see 8 Agric. L. Digest 103 (Aug. 8, 1997), the
IRS has announced changes in the reporting requirements
for 1997 Form 1099-S, Proceeds From Real Estate
Transactions. The form will be required only for
transactions greater than $250,000 for single sellers and
$500,000 for married sellers. Ann. 97-106, I.R.B. 1997-__,
__.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENSES.
The taxpayers were members of partnerships formed for
the purpose of investing in possible jojoba growing
businesses. The partnerships were on the accrual method of
accounting. On the last day of a tax year, the partnerships
entered into contracts for the investigation of whether it
would be feasible to grow jojoba plants in a certain area in
Arizona. The farms attempted to grow jojoba in the area
but conducted no scientific tests or evaluation of the
growing attempts. The court held that the taxpayers were
not entitled to deduct the costs of the attempt to grow
jojoba because the taxpayers were not in the trade or
business of growing jojoba and no scientific tests or
evaluations were conducted. The court found that the farms
merely attempted to grow the plants as any farmer would in
growing a crop. The court also noted that no records were
maintained with which to evaluate the reasons for success
or failure of the crop. Cactus Wren Jojoba, Ltd. v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-504.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
ELECTION. The IRS has issued proposed regulations
describing how elective changes in an entity's classification
will be treated for federal tax purposes. Under the final
regulations, there are four possible changes in classification
by election: (i) a partnership elects to be an association; (ii)
an association elects to be a partnership; (iii) an association
elects to be a disregarded entity; and (iv) a disregarded
entity elects to be an association.
The proposed regulations provide a specific
characterization for each of the four possible elective
changes. In each case, the characterization provided in the
proposed regulations attempts to minimize the tax
consequences of the change in classification and achieve
administrative simplicity. The proposed regulations
provide that if an association elects to be classified as a
partnership, the association is deemed to liquidate by
distributing its assets and liabilities to its shareholders.
Then, the shareholders are deemed to contribute all of the
distributed assets and liabilities to the partnership. This
characterization of an elective change from an association
to a partnership is consistent with Rev. Rul. 63-107, 1963-1
C.B. 71.
    If a partnership elects to be classified as an association,
the partnership is deemed to contribute all of its assets and
liabilities to the association in exchange for stock in the
association. Then, the partnership is deemed to liquidate by
distributing stock in the association to its partners. The
proposed regulations do not affect the holdings in Rev.
Rul. 84-111, 1984-2 C.B. 88, in which the IRS ruled that it
would respect the particular form undertaken by the
taxpayers when a partnership converts to a corporation.
    If an association elects to be disregarded as an entity
separate from its owner, the association is deemed to
liquidate by distributing its assets and liabilities to its sole
owner. Conversely, if an eligible entity that is disregarded
as an entity separate from its owner elects to be classified
as an association, the owner of the eligible entity is deemed
to contribute all of the assets and liabilities of that entity to
the association in exchange for stock of the association.
    The proposed regulations also provide that the tax
treatment of an elective change in classification is
determined under all relevant provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code and general principles of tax law, including
the step transaction doctrine. This provision in the
proposed regulations is intended to ensure that the tax
consequences of an elective change will be identical to the
consequences that would have occurred if the taxpayer had
actually taken the steps described in the proposed
regulations.  62 Fed. Reg. 55768 (Oct. 28, 1997).
ELIGIBILITY. The taxpayer was an S corporation
which agreed to purchase the stock of a second corporation
which was owned by a third corporation. In order to
preserve the taxpayer’s S corporation status, the second
corporation was immediately merged into the taxpayer.
The IRS noted that Rev. Rul. 72-320, 1972-1 C.B. 270
allows the momentary ownership of another corporation’s
stock by an S corporation as part of a divisive
reorganization. The IRS ruled that, because the taxpayer
intended only the momentary ownership of the stock as
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part of the acquisition of the second corporation, the stock
ownership did not terminate the S corporation status for
federal income tax purposes. Ltr. Rul. 9745004, July 30,
1997.
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The taxpayers sold their
principal residence on June 20, 1988. The taxpayers
purchased a transitional townhouse while searching for a
permanent residence. The taxpayers purchased a second
residence and moved most of their belongings to the new
residence on June 20, 1990, leaving some furniture in the
townhouse for the purpose of enhancing the appearance of
the property while attempting to sell it. Prior to June 21,
1990, the taxpayers also began the process of remodeling
the new residence but the actual work did not commence
until after June 21, 1990. Although there was some
evidence that the townhouse was still used by the taxpayers
after June 21, 1990, the court found that the taxpayers used
the new residence as their principal residence within the
two-year period requirement of I.R.C. § 1034. However,
the court did not allow inclusion of the renovation costs in
the purchase price of the new residence for I.R.C. § 1034
purposes because the renovations were not started prior to
June 21, 1990. Note: I.R.C> § 1034 was repealed by TRA
1997. Mitchell v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-493.
TRAVEL EXPENSES. The taxpayer was required by
an employer to work in cities other than where the taxpayer
maintained a residence. The temporary employment was
intended to last only a few weeks but the taxpayer soon
realized that the employment would continue for much
longer and moved a recreational vehicle to the employment
location for living quarters. The court ruled that the
taxpayer could not claim deduction for travel and lodging
expenses during the temporary employment because the
employment was indefinite and the taxpayer’s work
residence changed to the temporary residence during the
employment. The case is designated as not for publication.
Weichlein v. Comm’r, 97-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,872 (9th Cir. 1997).
LABOR
MIGRANT AGRICULTURAL LABOR. The
defendant was a grower, harvester and processor of citrus
fruit. The defendant contracted with third party farm labor
contractors to provide, transport and supervise the
harvesters of the citrus crops. The defendant required each
contractor to provide evidence of certification of the
contractor and the contractor’s vehicles; however, the
defendant did not make periodic checks to insure that the
contractors continued to comply with all MSAWPA
requirements. A USDA inspection of the defendant’s
operation produced the discovery that several vehicles used
by the defendant on site and the contractors did not comply
with state and federal safety requirements and that several
vehicles used to transport workers to the harvesting site
were not certified at all. The defendant then disposed of the
vehicles used on site. The USDA sought an injunction
against the defendant which would require the defendant to
periodically check each vehicle for compliance with
MSAWPA. The defendant argued that such checks were
unreasonable because of the expense required for
inspection of each vehicle. The court denied the injunction
as to the defendant’s vehicles because the defendant had
disposed of the vehicles and there was no evidence that the
defendant intended to obtain replacement vehicles. The
court granted the injunction as to the vehicles used by the
contractors because the defendant could require all vehicles
to display a compliance certificate on the front windshield,
allowing for easy inspection by the defendant. Metzler v.
Lykes Pasco, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 1438 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
CORN HEAD. The plaintiff was injured while
working with a corn head manufactured by the defendant.
The corn head was purchased used by the plaintiff’s
employer and added to a combine manufactured by a third
party. The employer also painted the corn head twice,
covering the warning labels originally placed on the corn
head by the defendant. The modified combine was able to
harvest corn but was not equipped to harvest sorghum
while moving. The employer used the modified combine in
a stationary position as an in-field crop testing machine,
requiring the hand harvesting of the sorghum and loading
of the sorghum into the corn head. The plaintiff was
injured while dumping sorghum into the corn head from
the front, although the plaintiff had been orally warned by
the employer not to approach the corn head from the front.
The plaintiff filed for damages under strict liability,
claiming that the corn head was defective for failure to
have a proper guard, a shutoff clutch and adequate
warnings. The court denied the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment on the issue of whether the plaintiff’s
use of the corn head was reasonably foreseeable, because
the plaintiff had expert testimony as to the common
practice of farmers to modify their equipment to meet
special needs. The court denied the plaintiff the use of
expert testimony as to the reasonableness of a guard on the
corn head because the expert’s testimony was unreliable in
that it was not based on tests or other scientific evidence.
The court noted that a video of the corn head in operation
demonstrated that the dangers of the corn head were open
and obvious. The court also denied the use of expert
testimony as to use of raised plastic warning labels which
would have remained exposed even when painted. The
court noted that the expert had no tests or other reliable
evidence to support the feasibility of such labels. The court
granted summary judgment to the defendant on the failure
to warn issue because the evidence demonstrated that the
plaintiff was orally warned about the danger of injury and
did not heed the warnings. The court stated that the
plaintiff failed to demonstrate that any other warning
method would have deterred the plaintiff from approaching
the corn head from the front.  Jaurequi v. John Deere
Co., 971 F. Supp. 416 (E.D. Mo. 1997).
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2d ANNUAL SEMINAR IN PARADISE
  
FARM ESTATE AND BUSINESS PLANNING by Dr. Neil E. Harl
January 5-9, 1998
Spend a week in Hawai'i in January 1998! Balmy trade
winds, 70-80 degrees, palm trees, white sand beaches and
the rest of paradise can be yours; plus a world-class seminar
on Farm Estate and Business Planning by Dr. Neil E. Harl.
The seminar is scheduled for January 5-9, 1998 at the
spectacular ocean-front Hilton Waikoloa Village Resort on
the Big Island, Hawai'i.
Seminar sessions run from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. each
day, Monday through Friday, with a continental breakfast
and break refreshments included in the registration fee.
Each participant will receive a copy of Dr. Harl's 400 page
seminar manual, Farm Estate and Business Planning:
Annotated Materials which will be updated just prior to the
seminar.
     Here are the major topics to be covered:
   • Introduction to estate and business planning.
   • Liquidity planning with emphasis on 15-year installment
payment of federal estate tax.
   • Co-ownership of property, including discounts, taxation
and special problems.
   • Federal estate tax, including alternate valuation date,
special use valuation, family-owned business exclusion,
handling life insurance, marital deduction planning,
disclaimers, planning to minimize tax over deaths of both
spouses, and generation skipping transfer tax.
   • Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future
interests, handling estate freezes, and "hidden" gifts.
   • Income tax aspects of property transfer, including
income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private
annuities, self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part
sale transactions.
   • Using trusts, including funding of revocable living trusts.
   • Organizing the farm business--one entity or two,
corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited
liability companies.
   •  Ethics (2 hours).
The Agricultural Law Press has made arrangements for
group discount air fares on United Airlines, available
through Sun Quest Vacations. In addition, attendees are
eligible for substantial discounts on hotel rooms at the
Hilton Waikoloa Village Resort, the site of the seminar.
Early registration is important to obtain the lowest airfares
and insure availability of convenient flights at a busy travel
time of the year.
The seminar registration fee is $645 for current
subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest or the
Agricultural Law Manual. The registration fee for
nonsubscribers is $695.
If you have not yet received a registration packet call
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